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DO CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLASS
MEMBERS VITIATE CLASS ACTION
SECURITIES FRAUD SUITS?
DAVID J. Ross*
Many commentators believe that the enhanced pleading re-
quirements of the recently enacted Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act1 will reduce the number of private securities fraud
suits.2 However, a recent, but little noticed federal district court
decision may also greatly affect litigation of securities fraud suits
brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of
1934' and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder by the Securities
and Exchange Commission.4 Plaintiffs in these cases typically
" Vice President of Lexecon Inc. Lexecon is an economics consulting firm that
has provided assistance to various parties in numerous securities fraud cases.
I would like to thank Kenneth R. Cone, Charles C. Cox, Daniel R. Fischel and
Robert S. Stillman for their valuable comments, and Debbie W. Zimmerman for her
research assistance.
'Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) [hereinafter PSLRA].
2 See Curbing Stock-Swindle Swindlers, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 9, 1995, at B6
(noting that provisions in PSLRA, such as requiring plaintiffs to post bond before
suing, create "steep barrier[s] for small investors"); Mark Griffin, Securities Litiga-
tion Bill is Reform in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1995, at § 3 p. 13 (stating
that PSLRA "is more accurately described as securities litigation repeal"); Ed
McCracken, The New Threat to High-tech Firms, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 1995, at A19
(quoting Senator John Kerry as stating that one purpose of PSLRA was to reduce
number of "speculative suits based on no evidence of wrongdoing"); Safe Harbor for
Fraud, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 13, 1995, at B6 (contending that Congress took
"meat-ax to a problem that was better suited to a chisel").
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b) of the Act makes it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national security exchange ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors.
Id.
, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995). This regulation makes it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
seek to have their cases certified as class actions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 23(b)(3). Qualification as a
"(b)(3)" class action requires the establishment of six elements:
numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation,
predominance and superiority.5 Until recently, courts had rou-
tinely found that securities cases satisfied these requirements
and, accordingly, certified them as class actions.6 However, in a
lengthy and thoughtful opinion, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, in In re Seagate Technol-
ogy II Securities Litigation,7 identified potential conflicts between
class members which call into question the ability of securities
fraud class actions to satisfy the typicality and adequacy of rep-
resentation elements of FRCP 23(a) and FRCP 23(b)(3).8
The Seagate II court identified two situations in which con-
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, ... (b) [tlo make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading ... in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.Id. I FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3). For a detailed discussion of the requirements for
class certification under FRCP 23(a), (b)(3), see infra notes 17-23 and accompanying
text.
6 See, e.g., Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 122 F.R.D.
177, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("Securities actions are particularly suitable for class action
treatment and any doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing a class action.")
(citing Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946
(1985)); Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(stating that doubtful case should be resolved in favor of allowing class action);
Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (explaining that one reason for al-
lowing class actions is presumption that such actions are financially feasible for
class), order amended on other grounds, 49 F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
7 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Seagate Ill.
8 Id. at 1359. In Seagate II, a class action was brought alleging that "the price of
Seagate common stock was fraudulently inflated for a period of several months." Id.
at 1344. During this time the defendants allegedly did not fully disclose the truth
concerning the financial condition and business prospects of the corporation. Id. As
a result, the trading price of the stock declined gradually rather than declining sud-
denly as usually occurs when a one-time full disclosure of fraud is released. Id. Pur-
suant to FRCP 23, plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of all persons
who purchased shares during the period. Id.
Subsequently, summary judgment was granted for the defendants on the
grounds that the alleged fraud was not actionable. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig.,
1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2052, *31 (holding that there was no proof of fraud). The
finding of no proof of securities fraud by the Seagate II court does not affect its rea-
soning concerning the certification of class actions in securities fraud cases, and it is
this aspect of Seagate II that is the subject of this article.
[Vol. 70:209
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLASS MEMBERS
flicts can arise. The first situation, identified as the "seller-
purchaser conflict," arises when members of the proposed class
both bought and sold the security at issue during the relevant
period (such persons are called "seller-purchasers").9 The second
situation, identified as the "equity conflict," arises when mem-
bers of the proposed class hold equity in the security's issuer at
the time of the litigation (such persons are called "current hold-
ers"). 0 For an actively traded security, it is virtually certain that
both circumstances will be present to some extent: some class
members will have both purchased and sold securities during the
class period and some class members will be holding equity in
the security's issuer while the case is being litigated.
The court's analysis in Seagate H demonstrates that securi-
ties cases in which the proposed class contains seller-purchasers
or current holders cannot meet the requirements of FRCP
23(b)(3) and, therefore, should not be certified as class actions.
The court, however, was unwilling to reach this conclusion and,
instead, ordered an "evidentiary hearing" to determine the ac-
tual extent of the potential conflicts." The Seagate 11 court did
not describe the evidence that would be relevant in such a hear-
ing and, because the plaintiffs elected to seek certification of a
class that did not contain seller-purchasers rather than submit
evidence about conflicts in the class initially proposed, no hear-
ing was ever held.'
The proceedings in Seagate H can be interpreted in two
ways. Under one interpretation, securities fraud cases could
never be certified as class actions if the proposed class contained
either seller-purchasers or current holders. Under the alterna-
tive interpretation, securities fraud cases could only be certified
as class actions following an evidentiary hearing to determine
the actual extent of potential conflicts. This article considers
both interpretations. Section I explains why conflicts arise and
9 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1359.
10 Id. at 1362.
"Id. at 1367. The Seagate 1I court concluded that:
[blecause of the potential for conflicts created by the fraud-on-the-market
theory and the out-of-pocket measure of damages, the adequacy of the rep-
resentation cannot be ascertained without examining the composition of
the class... . Accordingly, th[e] court has little choice but to resort to an
evidentiary hearing on these issues.
Id.
'2 In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 229, 230-31 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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the reason these conflicts should prevent class certification.
Section II considers and rejects the arguments and proposed pro-
cedures that courts have used to certify securities fraud cases as
class actions despite the existence of class conflicts. Section III
discusses the court's resolution of Seagate 11 and explains how
readily available evidence could be used in an evidentiary hear-
ing regarding the extent of class conflicts. Section IV concludes
by discussing the implications of Seagate II on future securities
fraud class actions.
I. How CLASS CONFLICTS ARISE IN SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
To understand the nature of the problems identified by the
Seagate II court, it is necessary to briefly discuss the require-
ments for class certification and the method by which plaintiffs
seek to satisfy these requirements in securities fraud cases.
A. The Requirements for Class Certification of a Securities Fraud
Case
Plaintiffs who bring securities fraud cases under Section
10(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
must establish that the defendants intentionally misrepresented,
misstated or failed to disclose material facts upon which the
plaintiffs relied, causing them injury.13 In other words, the six
elements of a securities fraud are the existence of a misstate-
ment or omission, scienter, reliance, materiality, causation and
damages.
As noted above, there are also six requirements that plain-
tiffs must satisfy to obtain class certification: numerosity, com-
monality, typicality, adequacy of representation, predominance
and superiority.15 The first four requirements stem from FRCP
23(a) which provides that:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-
tative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
13 See HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22.48
at 22-190 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter NEWBERG].
14 See id.See FED. R. CiV. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
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fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
16
In addition to these requirements, the plaintiffs must also
satisfy one of the three parts of FRCP 23(b); almost all plaintiffs
elect to bring securities class actions under subsection (3) of
FRCP 23(b)." This section of the federal rules imposes two ad-
ditional requirements: "that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members, and that a class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy."1
8
Of the requirements for class certification, only the typical-
ity and the adequacy of representation elements need further
elucidation. In order to meet the typicality requirement of FRCP
23(a)(3), the interests of the representative plaintiffs must be
aligned with those of the represented group. For typicality, the
plaintiff's claims must arise from the same event or practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class
members, and the plaintiffs claims must be based on the same
legal theory. 9 In these circumstances, the plaintiff will advance
the interests of the class members by advancing his or her own
self-interest.0 The adequacy of representation requirement is
satisfied when "there is an absence of antagonism between the
named plaintiff and the other class members" and "the absent
class members can be assured of a vigorous prosecution by the
named plaintiff and his counsel.""
Securities fraud cases typically satisfy the numerosity,
commonality and superiority requirements of FRCP 23 with
ease." The numerosity requirement is usually satisfied in cases
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
17 NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.46 at 22-188 ("Securities class actions seeking
primarily monetary damages for class members have been brought almost exclu-
sively under the Rule 23(b)(3) category.").
"FED. R. CiV. P. 23(b)(3).
See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1351 ("In essence, if the elements which the
named plaintiff had to prove to prevail were substantially similar to those elements
which the class members had to establish, typicality was satisfied.") (citations omit-
ted); NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.19 at 22-86 ("If they are substantially the same
as those needed to be proved by the class members to redress a wrong common to
the class and the plaintiff, the representative's claim is typical").
20 NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.17 at 22-58, 22-59.
21 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1346 (citing NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.24 at
22-102).
2" Id. at 1351-52; see also NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.9 at 22-24, § 22.14 at
22-31, § 22.48 at 22-190, and § 22.60 at 22-252.
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involving publicly traded securities because most corporations
have hundreds or thousands of shareholders who reside in geo-
graphically diverse areas.23 The commonality requirement is
satisfied because, under most circumstances, three of the six
elements of a securities claim raise common issues. The exis-
tence of a misstatement or omission and scienter are common is-
sues because these elements concern activities of the defendants
that may have adversely affected all class members.24
Another common question in securities fraud cases is mate-
riality. Information is considered material if there exists a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
information as significantly altering the total mix of infor-
mation. 25 Since this inquiry relates to the behavior of a reason-
able investor rather than any particular plaintiff, it is a common
question. Further, the superiority requirement, in general, is
easily satisfied because many potential class members will have
small claims that would be uneconomic to pursue individually.26
As discussed below, the remaining requirements of FRCP 23-
predominance, typicality and adequacy of representation-are
more problematic.
B. Predominance and the "Fraud-on-the-Market" Theory
FRCP 23(b)(3) requires that common issues predominate
over any questions affecting only individual class members.27
While three of the six elements of a securities fraud claim raise
common issues (the existence of a misstatement or omission, sci-
enter and materiality), the three remaining elements of a secu-
rities fraud claim-reliance, causation and damages-seem to
raise individual issues because they are personal to the plain-
tiffs.2 18 If these elements were viewed as individual issues, courts
would have great difficulty in finding that common issues pre-
23 NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.9 at 22-24. See also Friedlander v. Barnes, 104
F.R.D. 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that numerosity can be satisfied by
"hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of people").
2 See NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.15 at 22-36; see also In re Activision Sec.
Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding that commonality requirement
was met when plaintiffs alleged same material misrepresentation by each defen-
dant).
2 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988).
26 See Seagate 11, 843 F. Supp. at 1351-52; NEWBERG, supra note 13, § 22.61 at
22-260.
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
2 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1352.
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dominate.29
Rather than have courts struggle with this difficult question,
plaintiffs typically allege that the defendants' conduct was a
"fraud-on-the-market" because the defective disclosures affected
the market price of an issuer's securities." For example, plain-
tiffs may allege that by releasing false positive information or
failing to disclose negative information, an issuer caused its
stock price to be "artificially inflated."31 Under this theory, any-
one who traded the issuer's stock in the open market would have
been affected by the alleged fraud.32
Under the fraud-on-the-market theory, each of the three re-
maining elements of a securities fraud claim becomes a common
issue or, at least, has common elements. This has been recog-
nized most frequently with respect to the reliance element.33 Un-
Id. Nevertheless, as the Seagate II court noted, many courts have certified
securities fraud cases as class actions despite finding that three of the six elements
of the claim raised individual issues. Id. (citations omitted). The Seagate II court
criticized these holdings as being based on vague policy considerations instead of a
relative evaluation of the weight of common and individual issues as is required by
FRCP 23. Id. at 1352-53.
:" "The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the
available material information regarding the company and its business." Peil v.
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
31 Seagate 11, 843 F. Supp. at 1357. While most securities fraud cases do concern
buyers of common stock, securities fraud suits can be brought on behalf of sellers of
common stock as well as buyers and sellers of other securities. The discussion in the
text of buyers of common stock is for expositional convenience only; the issues dis-
cussed in the text would apply to other types of cases as well.
32 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).
The prevailing view is that requiring individual plaintiffs to prove direct reli-
ance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation by defendants does not comport with
modern securities transactions. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 745-46 (1975). Justice Blackmun, writing for a plurality of four Justices in Ba-
sic Inc., noted that "[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of
the proposed plaintiff class effectively would ... prevent[] [plaintiffs] from proceed-
ing with a class action, since individual issues then would ... overwhelm[] the com-
mon ones." Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 242. In order to overcome the conflict between
requiring individual proof or permitting the certification of a class in a private ac-
tion under Rule 10b-5 courts have emphasized the elements of materiality and cau-
sation. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976). The resulting fraud-on-the-market theory affords the plaintiff class
a presumption of actual reliance. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (noting in case 'involving primarily a failure to dis-
close, proof positive of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery"); Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 366 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986) (stating that
when alleged fraudulent conduct primarily involves failure to disclose plaintiffs are
not required to prove reliance).
1996]
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der the fraud-on-the-market theory, purchasers need not show
that they were aware of any specific false representation.' In-
stead, purchasers are said to have relied on the "integrity of the
market," i.e., the "supposition that the market price is validly set
and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated
the price."" Consequently, a plaintiff need not prove his own
personal reliance on the particular misrepresentation; instead
reliance is presumed.38 By making reliance a common issue, the
fraud-on-the-market theory shifts the balance in favor of a find-
ing that common issues predominate."
The impact of the fraud-on-the-market theory goes beyond
reliance. Causation is also a common element because a de-
frauded investor's damages result from the affect of the alleged
wrongdoing on the performance of his investment.38 Addition-
ally, the fraud-on-the-market theory is relevant to the question
of materiality: presumably the price of a security will be affected
by an alleged defective disclosure when "reasonable investors"
believe that the defect is significant.39 For this reason, a stock
price will be "artificially inflated" by an alleged misstatement or
3 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 243. The principal underlying the fraud-on-the-market
theory is that even investors who do not directly rely upon the misstatement or
omission will be defrauded by any public and material misstatement or omission re-
garding that company. Id.
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907. This theory is premised upon the assumption that,
in the efficient open securities market, the market price of any particular stock is
determined by all of the information regarding the company and its business that is
made available to the investing public. See Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61. It logically fol-
lows, therefore, that any misleading statement regarding a company or its business
will necessarily impact the price of the stock for that company as it is traded on the
market. Id. at 1161; see also Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62
N.C. L. REV. 435, 439-46 (1984) (detailing development of fraud-on-the-market the-
ory in federal court).
36 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 247; see also Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F.
Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (asking "Who would knowingly roll the dice in a
crooked crap game?").
37 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 242.
The private right of action that developed pursuant to Rule 10b-5 is rooted in
the common law of deceit. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543
(5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), afld in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d
523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting implied cause of action under Rule 10b-5 is essen-
tially tort claim). One of the elements of deceit is that the plaintiffs damages are
caused by the fraudulent activity of the defendant. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 105-107 (5th ed. 1984).
'9 See Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160-61.
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omission if and only if the alleged disclosure defect is material.
Even the damages issue has common elements under the
fraud-on-the-market theory. Typically, plaintiffs use the "out-of-
pocket loss" measure of damages in Rule 10b-5 litigation.4" Un-
der this measure, a defrauded buyer who holds stock until the
end of the class period would claim as damages the amount of
the "artificial inflation" on the date that he or she purchased the
stock.4 Traders who both buy and sell shares during the class
period would claim as damages the difference between the infla-
tion on the date of purchase and the inflation on the date of
sale.42 Thus, all investors who bought and sold shares on the
same dates would have the same per share damage claim. The
only individual issues with respect to damages are the dates and
amounts of a particular investor's transactions. Hence, under
the fraud-on-the-market theory, five of the six elements of a se-
curities fraud claim are common and the remaining issue, dam-
ages, has common elements. For this reason, the fraud-on-the-
market theory has been viewed as a procedural device that fa-
vors class certification by providing a method for class actions to
satisfy the predominance requirement of FRCP 23(b)(3).4  As
will be discussed below, however, the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory has other effects that call into question whether securities
fraud cases can meet the typicality and adequacy of representa-
tion requirements for certification under FRCP 23(a).
C. Class Conflicts, Typicality and Adequacy of Representation
While the claims of different class members may well raise
common questions, this need not imply that different class mem-
40 Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908.
4' Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1357.
42 See id. Strictly speaking, the "out-of-pocket" loss accurately measures the
economic loss attributable to an alleged fraud only in the special case where there
are no intervening factors that affect a security's price. See Janine S. Hiller & Ste-
phen P. Ferris, Use of Economic Analysis in Fraud on the Market Cases, 38 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 535, 551-56 (1990). In many circumstances, it may be important to take
into account intervening causes when calculating damages. See id.
43 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1357-58. "Because proof of the existence of a mis-
statement or omission, scienter, and price inflation all constitute questions of law
and fact common to the class, virtually no individual questions remain, and the pre-
dominance prerequisite is easily satisfied." Id. at 1358 (footnote omitted); see also
Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involv-
ing Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 12 (1982) ("The fraud on the market
theory can be viewed as a procedural device that favors plaintiffs because it allows a
class to be certified by shifting the burden of proof on the reliance issue.").
1996]
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bers want common answers to those questions. Instead, each
class member wants to establish answers to the questions that
maximizes his or her own welfare. The possibility that different
class members will want different answers calls into question
whether securities fraud cases can meet the typicality and ade-
quacy of representation requirements for class certification un-
der FRCP 23(a).
The Seagate H court noted that the fraud-on-the-market
theory potentially gives rise to two kinds of conflicts among class
members: the "seller-purchaser conflict" and the "equity con-
flict."44 The seller-purchaser conflict arises whenever members
of the proposed class both bought and sold the security at issue
during the proposed class period (a person who first bought stock
and then sold stock during the class period is known as an "in-
and-out" and a person who first sold stock and then bought stock
during the class period is known as an "out-and-in"). 45 A seller-
purchaser class member is both a beneficiary (as a result of his
or her sales) and a victim (as a result of his or her purchases) of
the alleged fraud. A seller-purchaser only has damages if the
amount of his or her losses from purchasing at artificially in-
flated prices exceed the amount of his or her gains from selling
at artificially inflated prices. Moreover, for a seller-purchaser
class member, the smaller the inflation on his or her sale dates,
the greater his or her damages.
These properties of a seller-purchaser class member's out-of-
pocket loss can create conflicts with other class members. To
maximize damages, the seller-purchaser class member would
want the plaintiffs' counsel to establish that the stock price was
substantially inflated on the dates when he or she purchased but
was not inflated on the dates when he or she sold.4" Obviously,
proving this would not be in the interest of class members who
"Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1359, 1362.
In/out plaintiffs benefit from maximizing the difference between the inflation
at purchase and inflation at sale. Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1359. The in/out plain-
tiff's interest, therefore, is in minimizing the degree of price inflation existing at the
date of sale. Id. In contrast, a plaintiff buying on the day an in/out plaintiff sells has
the opposite interest, i.e., to maximize the price inflation on that date. Id. Different
plaintiffs have conflicting incentives in shaping the evidence. Id. The seller-
purchaser conflict has been raised by defendants in numerous courts, usually to no
avail. Id.; see also Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908 (explaining seller-purchaser conflict in
detail); Simon, 73 F.R.D. at 484 (engaging in brief discussion of seller-purchaser
conflict).
46 Seagate 11, 843 F. Supp. at 1359.
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purchased stock on or near the sale dates; those class members
would want to prove that the stock price was inflated on those
dates to maximize their own damage claims.47 Further, class
members who purchased on other dates would not want to make
the seler-purchaser plaintiffs' argument (that the stock price
was substantially inflated on some days but not others) if it
weakened their damage claim (which would require a finding
that the stock price was substantially inflated on the dates of
their own purchases).48
The second potential conflict identified by the Seagate II
court, the equity conflict, arises whenever a class member holds
stock while the litigation is pending and the issuer is a defen-
dant.49 This conflict arises because any damage award paid by
the issuer will reduce the value of a current holder's shares
(which are residual claims on the issuer's assets).0 Thus, pay-
" See id. Conflicts between seller-purchasers and purchasers (who did not sell)
are not necessarily irreconcilable, because both a seller-purchaser and a purchaser
who bought on the date of the seller-purchaser's sales could maintain damage
claims as long as the average amount of inflation on the dates of the seller-
purchaser's sales was less than the amount of inflation on the dates of his or her
purchases. However, because a purchaser who bought on the days the seller-
purchaser sold has no interest in showing that the amount of inflation was higher
on the dates the seller-purchaser purchased, he or she may not want to allocate the
resources of the class to demonstrate that this necessary condition holds. Thus,
conflicts may occur even under these circumstances. See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908-9.
s See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1359. Note that the seller-purchaser conflict
arises when particular class members both bought and sold the relevant security. It
does not matter whether sales preceded purchases or purchases preceded sales.
When a particular class member's sales occur first, he or she will want to argue that
the amount of inflation increased during the relevant period, to maximize his or her
damages. Conversely, class members whose purchases occur first will want to argue
that the amount of inflation decreased during the relevant period. Id.
49 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1362. This form of conflict is likely to arise from
the dual interests held by some members of the plaintiff class. Id. Specifically, those
plaintiffs who still own shares of the relevant security at the date of the suit have
divided loyalties. The current holders seek recovery for themselves, but as equity
holders in the relevant issuer they also want to minimize the overall liability of the
issuer. Id.; see also Able, 47 F.R.D. at 15 (noting defrauded stock holder "wears two
hats").
6' Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1362. Defendants have had little success in pre-
venting class certification on the basis of the "equity conflict." See Herbst v. Int'l Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1314 (2d Cir. 1974). The idea embraced by the courts is
that the defrauded shareholders personal interests far overshadow his interest as
an equity holder. See Able, 47 F.R.D. at 15. Also, any potential class member whose
current holdings are so large has the option to request to be excluded from the class.
Id. Damage awards paid by defendants other than the issuer do not impose any
costs on current holders, however, any indirect costs borne by issuers (such as legal
fees, lost management time and costs associated with indemnity agreements) ad-
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ment of an award to the class can only make a current holder
better off if his or her share of the recovery exceeds his or her
share of the costs.5 A current holder's net benefit will depend on
his or her share of the benefits and costs. The conflict with other
class members arises because the current holder's net benefit is
increased by maximizing his or her own recovery and minimizing
the recovery of other class members (because the larger the ag-
gregate recovery, the lower the value of his or her current stock
holdings)." When the issuer will fund all or part of any recovery,
a current holder would want the plaintiffs to establish that the
stock price was inflated on the dates he or she purchased but not
inflated on any other dates. Obviously, this would not be in the
interest of class members who purchased on these other dates.
Moreover, if a current holder's current holdings are sufficiently
large, he or she may prefer that the litigation not occur at all be-
cause the expected cost of the litigation, resulting from a dimi-
nution in the value of the holder's shares, exceeds the expected
benefit.53
When seller-purchaser or equity conflicts exist, securities
fraud claims can not satisfy the adequacy of representation re-
quirement of FRCP 23(a). As explained above, there must be an
"absence of antagonism""' between the named plaintiff and other
class members for the adequacy of representation requirement to
versely affect current holders. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 495 F.2d at 1314.
" The Seagate II court noted that the fact that the individual plaintiff is more
interested in personal recovery than the overall welfare of the corporation only ad-
dresses the reason for that individual's participation in the class action. Seagate II,
843 F. Supp. at 1363. The court noted that this individual interest does not indicate
that he would be agreeable to numerous other plaintiffs receiving damage awards at
the expense of the corporation in which he possesses equity. Id.
Note also that because plaintiffs' counsel will receive a portion of any damage
award as a contingency fee, the benefit to the class from litigation is less than the
damage award.
52 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1364. The plaintiff in such a situation will be indif-
ferent as to whether the class members whose recovery he or she prevents are eq-
uity holders or non-equity holders. Id. In other words, the plaintiffs antagonism will
not discriminate because "both equity holders and non-equity holders will find
themselves opposed by this equity-holding plaintiff." Id.
" "[If, by chance, any class member currently has holdings of [the defendant
issuer's] stock so large that he would prefer not to assert his claims for past losses,
such a person ... always has the option under [FRCP] 23(c)(2) to request exclusion
from the class." Able, 47 F.R.D. at 15.
" See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining that absence of antago-
nism will assure class members vigorous prosecution on behalf of class by named
plaintiffs).
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be fulfilled. When there are class conflicts, there is antagonism.
This is most obvious when the proposed class representative is
either a seller-purchaser or a current holder, because persons in
either position have an incentive to reduce the damage claims of
other class members."5 However, conflicts will exist even when
the proposed class representative neither sold stock during the
class period nor currently holds stock, because such plaintiffs in-
terests will diverge from those of proposed class members who
either sold stock or currently hold stock.58
Both the seller-purchaser and equity conflicts would also
prevent securities fraud cases from satisfying the typicality re-
quirement of FRCP 23(a), because when there are class conflicts,
class members' claims will not arise from the same course of
conduct or the same legal theory.57 Each class member will want
to shape the evidence to maximize his or her own recovery and
minimize the costs of obtaining a recovery.58 These quantities
will depend on the extent of the alleged artificial inflation at any
point in time, the timing and magnitude of each class member's
purchases and sales, and the extent of each class member's cur-
rent holdings. Therefore, each class member might want to
highlight the significance of some of the alleged misrepresen-
tations and omissions and trivialize the importance of others. In
addition, different class members may have different interests in
presenting evidence as to when allegedly omitted information
should have been disclosed.
D. "Partial Curative Disclosure" Cases
The plaintiffs in Seagate II originally sought certification of
a class consisting of all persons, other than the defendants, who
purchased Seagate stock during the period April 13, 1988 to Oc-
tober 7, 1988.' 9 The plaintiffs alleged that even though Seagate
5 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (explaining in detail conflicts
caused by seller-purchasers and current holders).
r" Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1359.
V Id. at 1351. The Seagate II court reasoned that class conflicts should be dealt
with under the "adequacy of representation" element, because "alignment of interest
is not the test for typicality; it is the result." Id. at 1351 n.14 (citing NEWBERG, su-
pra note 13, § 22.17 at 22-59). When there are class conflicts, however, the class
representatives may want to pursue different claims than other class members,
raising questions as to typicality as well as adequacy.
Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
Id. at 1344-45.
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knew that it had been adversely affected by changing conditions
in its principal line of business, "[i]nstead of fully disclosing 'the
truth concerning its financial condition and business prospects,'
... starting with a press release on July 18, 1988, Seagate made a
series of 'grudging admissions of certain adverse facts-no one of
which was fully curative."'6 ° The Seagate H court reasoned that
because the "inflation ribbon" decreases upon "partial curative
disclosures" of the type described by the plaintiffs, such disclo-
sures implied that persons who purchased prior to and sold after
the disclosure would have significant damages, increasing the
probability that the seller-purchaser conflicts in the proposed
class would be severe.61 Therefore, the Seagate II court conclud-
ed that courts should be most concerned with the seller-
purchaser conflict in "a partial curative disclosure case" such as
Seagate II, and did not determine whether class conflicts would
be serious enough to preclude class certification in other types of
cases.
62
The court's reasoning in Seagate H is faulty in two respects.
First, seller-purchaser conflicts do not arise from changes in the
amount of "inflation" upon which everyone agrees, but from un-
certainty about whether and how much the "inflation ribbon" has
changed. If all plaintiffs agreed that the amount of inflation de-
60 Id. at 1344 (quoting Plaintiffs Second Consolidated Am. Compl. ' 53 at 30
and Plaintiffs Submission re Ending Date of Class Period, June 3, 1991, at 2).
" Id. at 1364. The Seagate II court explained that partial curative disclosure
leads to a greater potential of in/out traders in the plaintiff class, and the damages
suffered by these in/out traders will be more significant. Id. In the full disclosure
cases some fluctuation in the level of price inflation during the class period is to be
expected. Id. If there are no leakages or partial disclosures, the price of inflation will
remain substantially constant. Id. The Seagate H court concluded that because the
fluctuation in price inflation will be slight, the in/out plaintiffs are not likely to have
suffered a great amount in damages. Id. On the other hand, a partially curative
disclosure can be expected to decrease the level of price inflation only proportion-
ately. Id. The issuance of a series of partial disclosures creates a "step effect" in the
amount of price inflation, each disclosure partially ratchets down the amount of in-
flation. Id. The "steps" created by partial disclosures will increase the potential of
in/out traders. Id. at 1365. In the one-time full disclosure case, not every individual
that bought and sold in the relevant period will be entitled to recovery, as slight
fluctuations that occur may mean that some plaintiffs sell at price inflation levels
equal to or higher than that at which they bought. Id. With partial disclosures, how-
ever, all persons whose transactions branch across "steps" will be entitled to in/out
damages. Id. Also, because of the periodic significant downward "steps" in the
amount of price inflation (as opposed to the slight fluctuations associated with full
disclosure, in/out damages will be greater. Id.
6Seagate I, 843 F. Supp. at 1365.
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creased following some partial curative disclosure, then persons
who bought before and sold after the disclosure would have a
significant damage claim and persons who bought after the dis-
closure would have smaller damage claims: there would be no
conflict. Conflicts arise when there are disagreements about the
amount of inflation. These may occur because plaintiffs who
bought before and sold after a disclosure would have an incentive
to minimize the amount of inflation after the disclosure and per-
sons who bought after the disclosure would want to maximize
this amount (in effect disputing the claim that the disclosure was
curative). The claims of subsequent purchasers, however, might
not be credible in the face of a partial curative disclosure. For
this reason, partial curative disclosures only increase conflicts if
such disclosures result in greater uncertainty about the amount
of inflation.
The second and more important defect in the Seagate 11
court's reasoning is that uncertainty about the amount of
"inflation" can arise without any "partial curative disclosure."
Class members may argue that the amount of "inflation" varies
for other reasons such as additional misstatements made by the
defendants during the class period, omitted information that the
defendants discovered and should have disclosed during the class
period, or as a result of information disclosed by third parties
during the class period. The incentives for class members to
make these arguments depends on the dates and amounts of
their own transactions. For this reason, seller-purchaser con-
flicts may be severe in cases without any "partial curative disclo-
sures."
II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS CLASS CONFLICTS
Many courts have certified securities claims as class actions
even when defendants have raised the issues of seller-purchaser
and equity conflicts.63 In some cases, courts have argued that
class conflicts cannot provide sufficient reason for denying certi-
fication.' In other cases, courts have argued that procedural
Id. at 1359 (citations omitted); see also Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908 (holding
seller-purchaser conflicts do not afford valid reason for refusing to certify class);
Greene v. Emerson Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 47, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (rejecting arguments that
equity conflicts and seller-purchaser conflicts should bar class certification).
See, e.g., Int'l Tel. & Tel., 495 F.2d at 1314 (concluding that any concern by
plaintiffs that damage award could harm corporation was outweighed by their per-
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solutions exist which can mitigate the problems created by class
conflicts.65 As recognized by the court in Seagate II, however, the
reasoning provided by previous courts is questionable.
A. Should Class Conflicts Prevent Class Certification?
Many courts have asserted that class conflicts only concern
the issue of damages and do not go "to the heart of the controver-
sy."6" Under this assumption, these courts conclude that class
conflicts, no matter how severe, cannot preclude a finding of
adequacy or typicality. This rationale, however, is clearly in-
correct because class conflicts concern the amount of alleged
"artificial inflation" which, under the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory, is relevant not only to the issue of damages, but also to the
issues of reliance, materiality and causation.6 Additionally, be-
cause the amount of inflation depends on which affirmative
statements were misrepresentations and when disclosures
should have been made, conflicts also arise concerning these is-
sues. 9 Thus, class conflicts can affect five of the six elements of
a securities claim.
Another reason courts have certified securities fraud cases
as class actions despite class conflicts is the belief that the tech-
niques of market analysis are too "sophisticated" to allow any
class representative to distort the evidence as to the amount of
price inflation for his or her own benefit." This argument ig-
nores the possibility that plaintiffs will shape the evidence as to
the factual claims (regarding which affirmative statements were
sonal interest in recovery).
"' See, e.g., Able, 47 F.R.D. at 15 (holding that any class member with large
holdings always has option under FRCP 23(c)(2) to request exclusion from class).
66 Seagate 11, 843 F. Supp. at 1358 (citing Blackie, 524 F.2d at 909); see also
Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621, 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that class conflict can-
not exist unless conflict is "genuine" and goes to "the heart of the matter") (citations
omitted); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151 (8th Cir. 1944)
("[A]ntagonism must be as to the subject matter of the suit.").
67 See, e.g., Gates, 67 F.R.D. at 632 ("[D]efendant's evidence of antagonism ...
should be nothing short of clear and convincing.").
'68 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1357-58.
'9 See id. at 1356 (recognizing that false positive statements or omissions of
negative fact result in artificial price inflation whereas false negative statements or
omissions of positive fact cause artificial price deflation).
70 See id. at 1360 (finding that argument that analysis is too difficult to manipu-
late "interesting"); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 149 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
("[Alvailable techniques of proof such as econometric modeling are sufficiently de-
manding of internal consistency as to reduce the opportunity for such manipulation
of data.").
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misrepresentations and when disclosures should have been
made) that determine the amount of price inflation. In addition,
there is the possibility that some plaintiffs may use incorrect
techniques of market analysis when it is in their interest to do
so. Thus, the existence of precise techniques for analyzing the
affect of any alleged misstatement is not sufficient to alleviate
class conflicts.
Finally, some courts have suggested that class conflicts are
not important because all plaintiffs have an interest in cooperat-
ing with each other so as to avoid collective defeat." But, as the
Seagate 11 court noted, "if the in/out trader cooperates with those
persons who purchased on the date that he sold, his recovery is
necessarily diminished, perhaps even eliminated."72 Similarly, if
a current holder cooperates with persons who purchased on
dates other than his or her purchase date, he or she may be
worse off than if there was a collective defeat.73 Thus, there is
good reason to doubt that cooperation is in every class members'
interest. Moreover, courts advancing this argument have never
explained the mechanism by which numerous, geographically
disparate class members could cooperate to resolve disputes.74
B. Proposed Procedural Remedies
Many courts have recognized the issue of class conflicts, but
have asserted that procedural devices exist which sufficiently
mitigate the problem.75 These assertions are also questionable.
One oft-proposed solution is "subclassing," which involves divid-
" See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1361 (recognizing but dismissing this argu-
ment).
Id. The Seagate H court's conclusion is too strong for the reasons stated su-
pra, note 47 (explaining that in/out traders will not always be harmed by cooperat-
ing with other plaintiffs).
73 See id. at 1363 (noting that current holder would not want "hundreds or thou-
sands of other plaintiffs receiving damage awards at the expense of the company in
which he possesses equity").
" Courts have certified classes under the assumption of cooperation without
any discussion of how, logistically, this cooperation occurs. See, e.g., LTV Sec., 88
F.R.D. at 148 (rejecting argument that in/out conflicts should bar class certification);
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that common in-
terests of plaintiffs outweigh conflicts).
75 See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 909 (recognizing problem of possible conflict but pro-
posing devices such as fashioned remedies and subclassing to relieve problem);
Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621, 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (allowing for an opposing group
to alter class through subclassing or "other modifications of the class action order").
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ing the class into subclasses based on the dates of transactions.6
The purported benefit of having subclasses is that conflicts
within the class can be eliminated by grouping class members
with similar interests.77 However, to avoid conflicts within sub-
classes there would need to be a separate subclass for each pos-
sible combination of purchase and sale dates (assuming that the
amount of inflation was required to be constant on any particu-
lar date).78 In a class period of many days, the number of sub-
classes would be far too large to be workable. In addition, sub-
classes only identify subsets of the proposed class that have
common interests; the use of subclasses can not eliminate the
conflicts of interest that exist between members of different
subclasses. Properly understood, the use of subclasses is merely
a method of accounting for class conflicts; subclasses do nothing
to mitigate these conflicts.79 Not surprisingly, none of the courts
which have suggested the use of subclasses for the purpose of
alleviating class conflicts has actually implemented this proce-
dure. °
Courts have also asserted that the ability of class members
to opt out of the class somehow protects class members from
conflicts."' A particular plaintiff, however, cannot cause a class
representative to pursue the particular plaintiffs interests by
opting out of the class. Moreover, particular plaintiffs would
have to evaluate the case before determining whether to opt out.
For most investors the costs of such an evaluation would be
prohibitive and would greatly increase the costs of class actions.
7' See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1361 (citing Blackie, 524 F.2d at 911; Koenig v.
Smith, 88 F.R.D. 604, 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
7 See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 911 (noting that judge will be able to assure fairness
by creating subclasses if necessary); LTV Sec., 88 F.R.D. at 149 ("[S]ubclassing has
the potential to cure any such problems."); see also Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that class conflicts may require
creation of subclasses, but do not necessarily bar class actions); Deborah L. Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1221-23 (1982) (describing
subclassing as one solution to deal with conflicts).
7" See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1362 ("[Flor each day of the class period, two
subclasses would be needed: one for all plaintiffs who purchased shares on that day
... and another for all in/out plaintiffs who sold shares on that day.").
79 See Rhode, supra note 77, at 1223-32 (describing problems with subclassing
such as bias, timing, manageability, and expense).
80 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1361 (stating that "[n]one of the reported cases has
attempted to implement subclasses").
8' See, e.g., Green, 541 F.2d at 1339 (recognizing right under FRCP 23(c)(2) and
(c)(3) to "opt out and not be bound by the judgment").
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In short, this "solution" runs counter to the entire theory of class
actions, which are supposed to provide a mechanism to allow for
the aggregation of claims to economize on costs.
III. MEASURING THE EXTENT OF POTENTIAL CLASS CONFLICTS
As noted above, the plaintiffs in Seagate II originally sought
certification of a class consisting of all persons, other than the
defendants, who purchased Seagate stock during the period
April 13, 1988 to October 7, 1988.2 After the Seagate II court
ruled that an "evidentiary hearing" would be required to deter-
mine the potential for conflicts created by the fraud-on-the-
market theory,83 the plaintiffs elected to seek certification of a
narrower class consisting of persons who purchased shares of
Seagate common stock prior to July 18, 1988 and did not sell any
shares of Seagate common stock during the same period.' In
Seagate II, the court stated that the new class avoided the "sell-
er-purchaser" conflict, but failed to address the remaining equity
conflicts.85 Despite the possibility of such conflicts, the court
certified the proposed narrower class without either requiring an
evidentiary hearing or providing any additional analysis of the
requirements of the FRCP."8
The court's resolution of Seagate II is inadequate because it
agreed to certify a class that included current holders even
though the court's analysis implied that, due to possible equity
conflicts, proposed classes which contain current holders cannot
fulfill the "adequacy of representation" requirement of FRCP
23(a).87 The Seagate II court could have resolved the equity con-
flict problem in the same way that it resolved the seller-
purchaser conflict problem-by refusing to certify a class which
82See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1344-45 (noting that another judge had earlier
ordered certification in four subclasses: "period 1) April 13, 1988 to July 19, 1988; 2)
July 20, 1988 to August 7, 1988; 3) August 8, 1988 to September 24, 1988; [and] 4)
September 25, 1988 to October 7, 1988").
Id. at 1365-66.
84 Seagate II, 156 F.R.D. at 230.
85 Id. at 231 (recognizing that determination of equity conflict would be diffi-
cult).
Id. (noting lack of information from either party to make determination as to
equity conflict and trend of courts to allow such actions despite possible class con-
flicts because of policy to afford legal recourse in securities fraud cases).
Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1362-64 (explaining equity conflict and dismissing
arguments that suggest adequacy of representation still exists despite equity con-
flict).
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contained current holders.88 A class that excluded any purchas-
ers during the class period who continued to hold shares as of
the date of the litigation, in addition to purchasers who sold
shares during the class period, would have been certifiable. 9
The court's resolution of Seagate II is also inadequate because it
did not describe the evidence that would have been relevant in
an evidentiary hearing as to the extent of class conflicts. 0 Sea-
gate II leaves unanswered important questions about how the
extent of class conflicts can be measured, what data can be used,
what the data would show and how this evidence would be used
to evaluate whether proposed classes satisfied the requirements
for class certification.91 The remainder of this article addresses
these questions.
A. Measuring the Extent of Class Conflicts
As previously noted, the seller-purchaser conflict arises
when members of the proposed class both sold and purchased the
subject security during the proposed class period." Obviously,
the greater the ratio of sales to purchases for any particular
class member, the greater his or her conflict with class members
who purchased shares on the dates he or she sold. This makes
the ratio of sales to purchases of individual class members (the
"sell-purchase ratio") a natural measure of the extent of the
seller-purchaser conflict. The potential for conflict is especially
severe when the sell-purchase ratio exceeds one. In this case, a
class member can benefit from litigating only by demonstrating
Although the Seagate H court recognized that the seller-purchaser conflict
would be so severe "that a class action would become utterly unworkable," the court
never stated that it would refuse to certify that class. Id. at 1362. The plaintiffs,
however, modified the scope of the class certification to remove such conflicts. Sea-
gate II, 156 F.R.D. at 230.
89 Alternatively, the Seagate II court could have refused to certify the proposed
class unless plaintiffs dropped the issuer, Seagate, as a defendant. If the issuer is
not a defendant and will not pay any damage award, then there is no equity conflict
because the value of a current holder's shares will not be affected by the litigation.
'0 Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1365-66 (ordering evidentiary hearing and in-
structing that plaintiffs prove "extent and severity of class conflicts" and establish
nature of "damages ... suffered by the various class members").
9' See id.
9'2 See Seagate II, 156 F.R.D. at 230-31 (eliminating need for evidentiary hearing
because scope of class had been modified by plaintiffs' counsel).
" See Seagate II, 843 F. Supp. at 1359 ("[Tlhe in/out plaintiffs interest lies in
minimizing the degree of inflation existing at the date of sale. A retention plaintiff
buying on that date ... has an exactly opposite interest .... ).
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that the average amount of inflation on his or her purchase dates
exceeds the average amount of inflation on his or her sale dates
by a greater percentage than the percentage amount by which
the class member's sales exceed his or her purchases.94 Addi-
tionally, as with any seller-purchaser, the lower the amount of
inflation on his or her sale dates, the greater his or her claimed
damages."
The equity conflict arises when members of the proposed
class (i.e., persons who purchased shares during the class period)
hold stock currently.98 As an analog to the sell-purchase ratio,
one might consider the ratio of shares currently held to shares
purchased during the class period as a measure of the extent of
equity conflict. This measure, however, would be inadequate for
two reasons. First, while, the equity conflict arises when a class
member holds shares currently, the extent of the conflict de-
pends on how large his share holdings are relative to the total
amount of shares outstanding; the larger the total amount of
shares outstanding, the smaller the conflict (because when there
are more shares outstanding, a greater share of the costs of the
litigation will be borne by others). Similarly, the benefit a class
member receives from any recovery depends not only on how
many shares he or she purchased during the class period, but on
how many shares were purchased by others (who may share in
any recovery); the larger the number of shares purchased during
the class period by others, the smaller the benefit. Thus, a bet-
ter measure of the equity *conflict is the ratio of the ownership
percentage (N/O, where N is the number of shares currently
held and 0 is the number of shares currently outstanding) to the
ratio of the purchase percentage (PIV, where P is the number of
shares purchased by the current holder during the class period
and V is the number of shares purchased by all class members
during the class period). The greater the equity ratio, the
greater the equity conflict.97 Particular attention should be paid
' Id. ("[In/out plaintiffs benefit from maximizing the difference between infla-
tion at purchase and inflation at sale.").
Id. (explaining effect of inflation on seller-purchaser conflict).
See generally supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (defining "equity"
conflicts, explaining why and when they occur, and describing their effect on class
actions).
17 Formally, suppose a company with 0 shares outstanding were to pay a total
damage award of some amount, D. The per share cost of such an award to current
holders would be D/0. If a current holder owns N shares, his or her share of the
1996] 229
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to current holders whose equity ratios exceed one. For the most
part litigating harms such current holders, because the costs the
litigation would impose on them will exceed the benefits they
would expect to obtain from the litigation.98
In summary, "seller-purchaser conflicts" arise whenever a
class member both bought and sold stock during the class period
and "equity conflicts" arise whenever a class member holds stock
while the litigation is pending. The extent of the "seller-
purchaser conflict" for any class member depends on the "sell-
purchase ratio" as defined above. The extent of the "equity con-
flict" for any class member depends on the "equity ratio" as de-
fined above. For each class member, these ratios are a function
of the number of shares he or she purchased during the class
period, the number of shares he or she sold during the class pe-
riod and the number of shares he or she holds while the litiga-
tion is pending.
B. Data Requirements
In a typical case, the information necessary to calculate
"sell-purchase" and "equity" ratios for every member of a pro-
posed class is not publicly available and could not be ascertained
without extensive discovery (such as a proof of claim proce-
dure).99 Publicly available information, however, can be used to
cost would be N*D/O. The current holder would only want to engage in litigation if
his or her expected recovery exceeded this amount. To determine whether this con-
dition holds, assume that V shares were purchased during the class period and that
each share purchased would receive an equal pro-rata amount of any recovery (an
assumption which is discussed in note 101 infra). Under these circumstances, each
class member would receive DIV per share. A current holder who purchased P
shares during the class period would receive P*DIV. The net benefit that a current
holder would receive from litigating is D*[P/ V - NI 0]. This amount is positive only
if the quantity in brackets is positive or, equivalently, if the quantity [N*VI(O*P)l
(which is the "equity ratio") is less than 1.0. For simplicity, this model assumes that
the issuer pays the entire damage award, the issuer has no other costs associated
with the litigation, and plaintiffs' counsel receives no contingency fee. While the
model contains several simplifying assumptions, nothing is lost, however, because in
a more general model, a plaintiffs willingness to litigate would still be inversely re-
lated to the equity ratio.
" The only exceptions would be those current holders with equity ratios less
than one that have reason to expect a greater than average per share recovery as
compared to other class members. The necessary "equity premium" can be calculat-
ed by subtracting 1.0 from the reciprocal of the equity ratio. Even if the equity
premium were sufficiently large, however, such current holders would have severe
equity conflicts because they would want to minimize the aggregate recovery in or-
der to reduce the costs the litigation imposes on them.
See Seagate 1I, 843 F. Supp. at 1362 (indicating that information regarding
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obtain some measure of the extent of these conflicts of interest.
In particular, certain types of institutions must submit quarterly
reports of their securities holdings to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission on Form 13F.' The information contained
in such filings is compiled by various data vendors. By examin-
ing sequential filings, one can determine the net number of
shares bought or sold by any particular institution during a spe-
cific quarter' and the number of shares currently held by the
institution. This information can then be used to assess the ex-
tent of the seller-purchaser and current holder conflicts.
C. Application to Seagate II
Seagate II provides an illustrative example. On March 31,
1988, institutions reported holdings of approximately 24,000,000
shares of Seagate common stock, approximately 49% of Seagate's
then outstanding shares. 2 Thus, institutions represented a
substantial fraction of Seagate shareholders. Table 1 reports
data necessary to assess seller-purchaser conflicts-the number
of shares purchased, the number of shares sold, and the "sell-
purchase ratio."1 3  The table shows that eighty-seven institu-
tions purchased shares during the relevant period, accounting
for total purchases of 28,048,851 shares.' Of these institutions,
twelve sold no shares during the period.' Collectively these
conflicts would need to be determined for "each transaction") (emphasis in original).
"" See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (1994) (requiring disclosure by institutional invest-
ment managers as to large securities holdings); 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1994) (requiring
Form 13-F to be filed).
... For example, if institution XYZ held 10,000 shares at the end of quarter one
and 20,000 shares at the end of quarter two, then institution XYZ had net purchases
of 10,000 shares during quarter two.
112 See infra app. A, tbl. 1 (Compilation of 13-F Forms by CDA Investment Tech-
nologies, Inc.).
'0 The institutional holdings data is available on a quarterly basis only. The
data shown is for the period from April 1, 1988 to September 30, 1988, a period
which closely approximates the class period in Seagate IL See infra app. A, tbl. 1. It
is not possible to identify offsetting purchases and sales of the same quantity of
shares that occur within a quarter using this data. For example, an institution
whose holdings increased by 10,000 shares during a quarter may have purchased
20,000 shares and sold 10,000 shares. For this reason, the calculations of the sell-
purchase ratio in table 1 are biased downwards and understate the potential class
conflicts. See id.
104 See id.
" See id. (Avatar Investors Assoc., Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., Capital Re-
search & Mgmt., Chemical Banking Corp., Cigna Corp., Fidelity Mgmt. & Res.
Corp., Hancock J. Spec. Equities, Keystone Custodian FDS, Killen Group Inc.,
Kingdon Capital Mgmt., NCM Capital Mgmt. Group Inc., and Norwest BK Minne-
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twelve institutions, which had no seller-purchaser conflict, ac-
counted for 9.6% of the total institutional share purchases.'
The remaining institutions each sold some shares and, therefore,
would have had seller-purchaser conflicts with other class mem-
bers.0 7 Many of these conflicts would not have been severe.
However, forty institutions, which collectively accounted for
26.8% of the total institutional share purchases, would have had
particularly severe seller-purchaser conflicts because they sold
more shares during the period than they purchased during the
period. °8
Table 2 reports data necessary to assess equity conflicts in
the proposed class-the number of shares of Seagate common
stock held on December 31, 1993 (the quarter ending immedi-
ately prior to the date of the Seagate II decision) by institutions
that purchased Seagate stock during the proposed class period.0 9
For each institution, table 2 reports the number of shares pur-
chased during the class period, the number of shares held on De-
cember 31, 1993 and the "equity ratio.""0 The table shows that
of the eighty-seven institutions that bought shares during the
class period, only six did not hold Seagate stock on December 31,
1993."' Collectively these institutions, which had no equity
sota NA).
106 See id. These twelve institutions collectively purchased 2,682,320 out of total
purchases of 28,048,851.
107 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (explaining seller-purchaser
conflict).
'08 See infra app. A, tbl. 1. These forty institutions purchased 7,527,352 out of a
total purchase of 28,048,851.
'09 See infra app. B, tbl. 2.
110 See id. Information about both the number of shares outstanding and the
number of shares purchased by proposed class members is required to calculate the
equity ratio. Seagate had 70.8 million shares outstanding as of December 31, 1988.
The reported volume of trading in Seagate stock from April 1, 1988 to September 30,
1988 was 123,970,911 shares. This figure represents the aggregate number of pur-
chases as well as the aggregate number of sales. However, many of these purchases
were made by market makers-intermediaries who quickly sold their stock to third
parties. Such persons are unlikely to be able to assert viable claims. The calcula-
tions in table 2 assume that half of the reported volume is attributable to the activi-
ties of such intermediaries. See id. For discussions of the effect of intermediaries on
reported volume, see Fischel & Ross, The Use of Trading Models To Estimate Ag-
gregate Damages in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Proposal For Change, in SE-
CURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES, 136 (National Legal Center for
the Public Interest 1994); Kenneth R. Cone & James E. Laurence, How Accurate are
Estimates of Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Cases?, 49 Bus. LAW. 505, 512
(1994).
. See infra app. B, tbl. 2 (Batterymarch Fini. Mgmt., Chubb Corp., Harris
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conflict, accounted for only 2.2% of the total institutional share
purchases."' The remaining institutions each held some shares
and, therefore, would have had equity conflicts with other class
members."' Although many of these conflicts would not have
been severe, thirty of the eighty-seven institutions, which collec-
tively accounted for 7.7% of the total institutional share purchas-
es, have equity ratios that exceed one, indicating severe equity
conflicts."4
The data shows that the Seagate II court's concerns about
the initial proposed class in Seagate II were well-founded-a
substantial fraction of the proposed class would have had severe
conflicts of both types. 15 Ultimately, the Seagate II court certi-
fied a narrower class consisting only of persons who purchased
shares of Seagate common stock during the period from April 13,
1988 to July 18, 1988 and did not sell any shares during the
same period.116 By definition, this narrower class has no seller-
purchaser conflicts," 7 but equity conflicts would remain.1 The
institutional holding data shows that fifty-three institutions
bought shares during the shorter proposed class period."' Of
these institutions only three did not hold Seagate stock on De-
cember 31, 1993.12' Collectively, these institutions, which have
no equity conflict, accounted for only 1.4% of the total institu-
tional share purchases. The remaining institutions each held
some shares and, therefore, would have had equity conflicts with
other class members. Also, twenty-one of the fifty-three institu-
Bankcorp Inc., Jacobs Levy Equity Mgmt., Lincoln Natl Corp., and Norwest Bank
Iowa NA).
2 See id. These six collectively purchased 611,169 out of a total purchase of
28,048,851.See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing equity conflicts).
114 See infra app. B, tbl. 2. These thirty institutions collectively purchased
2,151,559 shares out of a total purchase of 28,048,851.
11 See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text (indicating that 26.8 percent
of purchased shares had significant seller-purchaser conflicts and 7.7 percent of
purchased shares had significant equity conflicts).
16 Seagate II, 156 F.R.D. at 231.
117 Id.
18 See id. (C[S]till left unaddressed is the possibility of 'equity' conflicts in the
class.").
"9 See infra app. A, tbl. 1. As discussed in note 103, the institutional holdings
data is available on a quarterly basis. The figures reported in the text are for pur-
chasers during the period from April 1, 1988 to June 30, 1988, a period which closely
approximates the revised proposed class period in Seagate IL
" See infra apps. A & B, tbls. 1 & 2 (Chubb Corp., Harris Bankcorp. Inc., and
Lincoln Nat'l Corp.).
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tions, which collectively accounted for 6.1% of the total institu-
tional share purchases, have equity ratios that exceed one, indi-
cating severe equity conflicts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Seagate 11 may radically change litigation of securities fraud
cases because the potential conflicts between class members
identified by the court in Seagate II demonstrate that proposed
classes which include seller-purchasers or current holders do not
satisfy the typicality and adequacy of representation elements of
FRCP 23(b)(3) and, therefore, should not be certified as class ac-
tions. The Seagate II court was apparently uncomfortable with
this implication of its analysis and did not find that classes
which include sellers or current holders are automatically un-
suitable for certification. Instead, the court suggested that an
evidentiary hearing regarding the extent of the potential con-
flicts would be required before certification could occur. This ar-
ticle provides a rigorous framework for evaluating the extent of
potential conflicts and demonstrates how readily available data
can be used for this purpose in such evidentiary hearings. It re-
mains for the courts to determine under what circumstances
classes can be certified after properly measuring these conflicts.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
INSTITUTIONAL PURCHASES AND SALES OF SEAGATE
TECHNOLOGY, INC. COMMON STOCK
ApRi 1, 1988-SEPTEMBER 30, 1988
Institution Purchases Sales Ratio
ALGER FRED MANAGEMENT 5,595,000 4,961,800 0.89
ALLSTATE Lwa INSURANCE 733,000 108,000 0.25
ALPHA SOURCE ASSET MGMT 3,100 5,564,850 1795.11
AMmERCAN GENERAL CoRP 100 19,500 195.00
AMmvcAN NATL B&T/CmcAG 209,300 262,000 1.25
AVATAR INVESToRS Assoc. 85,000 0 0.00
BEA AssocIrATEs INC. 715,800 500 0.00
BANK OF BOSTON CoRP 185,000 220,450 1.19
BATrERYMARCH FINL MGMT 237,969 34,635 0.15
BENTLEY CAPITAL MGMT INC 269,200 279,000 1.04
BESSE ER TRUST Co N.A. 232,700 199,669 0.86
BRmSON PARTmRS INC 265,000 266,000 1.00
BROWN BRTHRS HARmL&Co 14,300 0 0.00
CMIB INVESTMENT COUNSELOR 117,700 2,100 0.02
CS FiRS BOSTON INC. 376,000 140,700 0.37
CAPITAL GuARDAN TRUST 250,000 237,700 0.95
CAPITAL RESEARCH & MGT 13,500 0 0.00
CHASE MANHATTAN CoRP 151,000 213,250 1.41
CHEMICAL BANKING CoRP. 306,500 0 0.00
CHUBB CORPORATION 212,000 424,650 2.00
CIGNA CORPORATION 469,550 0 0.00
CITCORP 23,350 75,200 3.22
COLLEGE RmmE EQuiTmEs 1,085,100 1,135,000 1.05
CONNOR CLARK & Co. LTD. 145,000 221,100 1.52
DARCY & Co INC 212,270 22,616 0.11
DAWSON-SAMBERG CAP MGMT 50,000 50,000 1.00
DIMENsIONAL FUND ADVS. 40,100 57,000 1.42
EAGLE AssET McMT. INC 54,200 19,240 0.35
EQtriT.LE ComPANms INC 91,000 33,000 0.36
EssEx INvEsTmENT MGMT Co 79,000 75,800 0.96
FARMERS GROUP INC 13,000 180,763 13.90
FmEL MGT & RES CORP 184,600 0 0.00
Frost CmcAGo CORP 114,000 245,000 2.15
FmsTr INTERSTATE BANCORP 150,800 175,000 1.16
FIRST PACIFIC ADVISoRS 48,400 317,037 6.55
FLORIDA ST BOARD/ADMIm. 527,300 536,942 1.02
FREMONT INvmNT ADVIsoRs 459,900 391,000 0.85
GRANTHAM MAYO VAN OWrER 159,000 159,000 1.00
GREAT WEST LIFE AssuR Co 31,998 22,000 0.69
GRUBER & McBAnM CAP MaT 131,200 343,800 2.62
HSBC HoLDiNGs PLC 144,900 147,000 1.01
HANCocK J SPEC EQurIEs 445,100 0 0.00
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Institution Purchases Sales Ratio
HARRIS BANKCORP INC. 30,000 25,000 0.83
Husic CAPrrA. MGmT. 67,500 173,000 2.56
IBM CREDIT INrr MGmT 28,800 30,000 1.04
IBM REIErr PLAN 1,777,000 1,236,000 0.70
INTEGRA Fn ANCIAL CORP. 28,000 54,500 1.95
INVESTMENT CoUNSELORS INC 117,700 120,000 1.02
INVESTMENT CoUNsELoRs/MD 571,000 558,200 0.98
INVESTMENT RESEARCH Co. 30,800 1,685,800 54.73
JACOBS LEVY EQurrY MGMT 97,000 64,000 0.66
KENTUCKY TEACHERS RETRm 72,566 7,000 0.10
KEYSTONE CUSTODIAN FDS 176,000 0 0.00
KEYSTONE INVESTMENT MOMT 85,000 85,000 1.00
KILLEN GROUP INC 479,200 0 0.00
KINODON CAPITAL MGMT 270,320 0 0.00
LASALLE NATL TRUST N.A. 118,134 173,961 1.47
LINCOLN NATL CORP 10,000 32,000 3.20
LYNCH & MAYER INC 651,215 500,800 0.77
MCKEE C S & Co INC 33,500 99,000 2.96
MCMORGAN & CoMPANY 7,761 200 0.03
MELLON BANK CORPORTION 10,500 48,000 4.57
MERCANTILE BANc/MiSSouRi 231,000 31,000 0.13
MONTAG & CALDWELL 19,000 20,000 1.05
MORGAN J P & Co INC 10,000 54,200 5.42
MORGAN STANLEY GROUP INC 129,600 18,100 0.14
MU-CANA INVT COUNSELLING 901,500 108,000 0.12
NCM CAPITAL MOMT GRP INc 32,200 0 0.00
NATIONAL CITY BK/KENTCKY 599,100 793,700 1.32
NATIONSBANK CORPORATION 35,000 14,883 0.43
NEW YORK ST TEACHERS RET 53,610 311,000 5.80
NIcHOLAS-APPLEGATE CAP. 357,600 208,000 0.58
NIPPON LIFE INSURANCE CO 1,248 212,000 169.87
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 552,100 30,200 0.05
NORWEST BANK IOWA N A 24,200 75,047 3.10
NORWEST BK MINNESOTA N A 206,600 0 0.00
NUMERIC INVESTORS L P 116,600 10,000 0.09
ONE VALLEY BANK N.A. 40,000 48,000 1.20
OPPENHEIMER MoGT. CORP. 1,806,500 137,000 0.08
PACIFIC MtrrUAL LIFE INS 965,650 592,935 0.61
PANAGORA ASSET MON-r INc 562,210 565,000 1.00
PHOENIX HOME LIFE MUTUAL 191,800 202,000 1.05
PRUDENTIAL INs CO/A.,i1R 28,000 123,000 4.39
PRUDENTIAL SECS. INC. 10,000 10,000 1.00
RUSSELL FRANK Co INc 46,000 46,000 1.00
SCHWAB CHARLES INVT MGMT 1,389,700 1,492,000 1.07
SEARS INVESTMENT MGMT 445,700 526,000 1.18
TOTAL 28,048,851 27,733,828
Source: Calculated from institutional holdings reported on Form 13-F as compiled by CDA
Investment Technologies, Inc.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 2
CLASS PERIOD PURCHASES OF SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY, INC.
COMMON STOCK









BANK OF BOSTON CoP
BATrERYMARCH FNL MGMT
BENTLEY CAPrrAL MGT INc




CS FmnR BOSTON INC.
CAPrrAL GUARDIAN TRUST







CONNOR CLARK & Co. LTD.
DARCY & Co INC
DAWSON-SAMBERG CAP MGMT
DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVS.
EAGLE ASSET MGmT. INC
EQurrABLE COMPANIES INC
EssEx INVESTMENT MGT Co
FARMERS GROUP INC
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GREAT WEST Lim AssUR Co
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LASALLE NATL TRUST N.A.
LINCOLN NATL CORP
LYNCH & MAYER INC





MORGAN J P & Co INC
MORGAN STANLEY GROUP INC
MU-CANA INVT COUNSELLING
NCM CAPITAL MGMT GRP INC
NATIONAL CITY BK/KENTCKY
NATIONSBANK CORPORATION
NEW YORK ST TEACHERS RET
NICHOLAS-APPLEGATE CAP.
NIPPON LIFE INSURANCE Co
NORTHERN TRUST CORP
NORWEST BANK IOWA N A
NORWEST BK MINNESOTA N A
NUMERIC INVESTORS L P
ONE VALLEY BANK N.A.
OPPENHEIMER MGMT. CORP.
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INS
PANAGORA ASSET MGMT INC
PHOENIX HOME LFE MUTUAL
PRUDENTIAL INS Co/AMER
PRUDENTIAL SECS. INC.
RUSSELL FRANK Co INC


















































Source: Calculated from institutional holdings reported on Form 13-F as compiled by CDA
Investment Technologies, Inc.
Holdings 12/31/93
0
781,500
19,000
165,900
38,350
440,700
517,350
10,700
0
38,500
200,000
676,350
216,600
100,000
20,500
0
81,200
481,000
579,100
1,627,755
2,000
1,694,306
10,800
37,647
467,004
296,750
14,000
17,260
53,400
184,200
8,700
21,900
0
64,700
303,000
1,600
945,000
285,500
67,800
150,000
142,400
112,938
126,800
9,400
19,000
27,991,044
Equity Ratio
0.00
10.14
0.58
0.08
1.20
3.28
0.79
0.30
0.00
0.46
1.00
6.97
0.40
0.32
0.15
0.00
0.11
12.58
65.36
135.79
0.01
78.11
0.95
0.25
0.45
8.07
0.02
0.43
0.87
0.45
6.11
0.03
0.00
0.27
2.28
0.04
0.46
0.26
0.11
0.69
4.45
9.89
2.41
0.01
0.04
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